Results from Nie and Rutkowski [12, 14] are extended to the case of the margin account, which may depend on the contract's value for the hedger and/or the counterparty (recall that the collateral was given exogenously in [12, 14] ). The present work generalizes also the papers by Bergman [1], Mercurio [11] and Piterbarg [16] . Using the comparison theorems for BSDEs, we derive inequalities for the unilateral prices and we give the range for its fair bilateral prices. We also establish results yielding the link to the market model with a single interest rate. In the case where the collateral amount is negotiated between the counterparties, so that it depends on their respective unilateral values, the backward stochastic viability property studied by Buckdahn et al. [4] is used to derive the bounds on fair bilateral prices.
Introduction
In Bielecki and Rutkowski [2] , the authors introduced a generic nonlinear market model which includes several risky assets, multiple funding accounts, as well as the margin account for collateral (for related studies by other authors, see also [3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16] ). We continue their study by examining the pricing and hedging of a derivative contract from the perspective of the hedger and his counterparty. Since we work within a nonlinear trading framework, the prices computed by the two parties of a contract do not necessarily coincide and thus our goal is to compare these prices and to derive the range for no-arbitrage bilateral prices. As emphasized in [2, 12, 13] , the initial endowments of the hedger and the counterparty become important factors in arbitrage pricing in the nonlinear setup. In [12, 14] , we studied collateralized contracts in the model with partial netting and Bergman's model, respectively. Using comparison theorems for BSDEs, we derived the range for either fair bilateral prices or bilaterally profitable prices. It should be stressed that in [12, 14] , the collateral amount was assumed to be exogenously specified and thus it was independent of unilateral values of the contract for the two parties. By contrast, we study here a more realistic situation where the collateral is endogenous, meaning that it may depend on the marked-to-market value of the contract either for one party (say, the hedger) or it is negotiated between them. Although we focus here on two particular instances of market models, it is clear that the method developed in this work can be applied to a large variety of models and/or collateral covenants.
Motivated by the seminal paper by Bergman [1] , we first consider an extension of his trading model to the case of endogenous collateral. To the best of our knowledge, the case of endogenous collateral was not studied in the existing literature, except for the special case of the proportional collateral examined by Piterbarg [16] and Mercurio [11] . We give here essential extensions of their results using the BSDE approach. First, we consider general collateralized contracts, rather only than path-independent European claims. Second, in [11] , the collateralization of the hedger (resp., the counterparty) was postulated to be a constant proportion of the hedger's (resp., the counterparty's) value, which apparently means that the two parties either post or receive the collateral amounts specified by two different margin accounts. This is clearly inconsistent with the market practice where the collateral amount posted by one party coincides with the amount received by another party. We derive inequalities satisfied by unilateral prices of a contract and we give the range for its fair bilateral prices. We show that if the collateralization depends on the values for the hedger and the counterparty, the backward stochastic viability property (BSVP) plays an important role in derivation of pricing inequalities. Motivated by results from the papers by Buckdahn et al. [4] and Hu and Peng [10] , we obtain the range of fair bilateral prices for European contingent claims. In the second step, we consider the market model with partial netting under the assumption of full rehypothecation of the cash collateral. Once again, in contrast with our previous work [12] , we study here the case of the collateral depending on the hedger's value and/or counterparty's value. We establish similar results as for Bergman's model. It is worth noting, however, that the model with partial netting enjoys some additional properties with respect to the class of monotone contracts, which are not necessarily shared by Bergman's model. This emphasizes the impact of asset-specific funding costs on properties of hedging strategies and prices of contracts.
The work is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall some definitions and assumptions introduced in our previous works [2, 12, 14] . In Section 3 and 4, we examine extensions of the model studied by Bergman [1] and Mercurio [11] . In Section 3, we consider the case where the collateral depends only on the hedger's value and we establish inequalities for unilateral prices of a general contract. Moreover, we extend the results from [11] regarding the relationship to the market model with a single uncertain interest rate. In Section 4, we study the case where the collateral depends on both the hedger's and the counterparty's values under the assumption that the risky asset is driven by a Brownian motion. Using the BSVP technique from [4] , we derive the inequalities for unilateral prices. In Sections 5 and 6, we examine the model with partial netting and we obtain similar results for the range of fair bilateral prices. We also show that the model with partial netting has some additional properties of independence of the initial endowment and/or positive homogeneity with respect to particular classes of contracts. We thus conclude that no unified theory can be developed in the non-linear framework, so that each particular setup should be studied on a standalone basis.
Preliminaries
We provide here a very brief summary of concepts and notation introduced in [2, 12, 14] . For more details and explanations, the reader is referred to the original papers. Let T > 0 be a fixed finite trading horizon date for our model of the financial market. We denote by (Ω, G, G, P) a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness, where the filtration G = (G t ) t∈[0,T ] models the flow of information available to all traders. For convenience, we assume that the initial σ-field G 0 is trivial. Moreover, all processes introduced in what follows are implicitly assumed to be G-adapted and any semimartingale is assumed to be càdlàg. As in [12, 14] , for any i = 1, 2, . . . , d, we use the following notation for the market data: A -a bilateral financial contract, or simply a contract. The process A is finite variation and it represents the cumulative cash flows of a given contract from time 0 till its maturity date T , C -the cash collateral, specified as a G-adapted process satisfying C T = 0, S i -the ex-dividend price of the ith risky asset with the cumulative dividend stream A i , B l (resp., B b ) -the lending (resp., borrowing) cash account, B i,l (resp., B i,b ) -the lending (resp., borrowing) funding account associated with the ith risky asset, B c -the process specifying the interest paid/received on the collateral account received/posted.
Assumption 2.1
We work throughout under the following assumptions: (i) S i is a semimartingale and A i is a process of finite variation with
in the case of a model with partial netting, we also assume that B i,l = B l for every i,
for some G-adapted and bounded processes r l , r b , r i,b and r c . Moreover, we postulate that 0 ≤ r l ≤ r b and r l ≤ r i,b .
We define the interest process of the margin account by setting F C t := − t 0 r c u C u du for every t and we denote A C := A + C + F C . For a collateralized hedger's trading strategy (x, ϕ, A, C), we write: (i) V t (x, ϕ, A, C) -the hedger's wealth at time t, (ii) V p t (x, ϕ, A, C) -the value of hedger's portfolio at time t. Note that V p t (x, ϕ, A, C) − V t (x, ϕ, A, C) = C t measures the impact of the margin account represented by the collateral amount C t on the hedger's trading strategy under the standing assumption of full rehypothecation. Finally, we set V 0
is the initial endowment of the hedger (resp., the counterparty) at time 0. Definition 2.1 Any G t -measurable random variable for which a replicating strategy for A over [t, T ] exists is called the hedger's ex-dividend price at time t for a contract (A, C) and it is denoted by P h t (x 1 , A, C), so that for some self-financing trading strategy ϕ, which replicates (A, C), we have
. For an arbitrary level x 2 of the counterparty's initial endowment and a strategy ϕ replicating (−A, −C), the counterparty's ex-dividend price P c t (x 2 , −A, −C) at time t for a contract (−A, −C) is implicitly given by the equality
Bergman's Model with Hedger's Collateral
In Sections 3 and 4, we consider an extended version of the model studied by Bergman [1] . For a detailed analysis of this model, we refer to the recent work by Nie and Rutkowski [14] . Note that in this framework the funding accounts B i,l and B i,b are not introduced.
Following [2, 12, 14] , we introduce the auxiliary processes S i,l,cld and S i,b,cld , which are given by the following expressions, for i = 1, 2, . . . , d,
It is easy to see that the dynamics of these processes are
As in [14] , we consider an arbitrary self-financing trading strategy ϕ = (ξ 1 , . . . ,
From Proposition 2.9 in [14] , it is known that the process Y l := (B l ) −1 V p (x, ϕ, A, C) satisfies
where Z l,i := ξ i , i = 1, 2, . . . , d and the generator G l is given by the following expression, for all
Similarly, the process
Recall that the initial endowment of the hedger (resp., the counterparty) is denoted by x 1 (resp., x 2 ). Without loss of generality, we assume throughout that x 1 ≥ 0 and we consider an arbitrary level of x 2 . Furthermore, in Sections 3 and 5, we work under the following standing assumption of hedger's collateral, that is, the situation where the collateral amount only depends on the hedger's wealth V h := V (x 1 , ϕ, A, C).
Assumption 3.1
The hedger's collateral C is given by the equality
for some uniformly Lipschitz continuous function q : R → R such that q(0) = 0.
Example 3.1 For instance, the hedger's collateral C can be specified as in [2] (see equation (4.10) therein) through the following expression
for some bounded haircut processes α 1 , α 2 , so that q(y) = (1 + α 1 )y + − (1 + α 2 )y − . It is clear that q is uniformly Lipschitz continuous and q(0) = 0. The case of the fully collateralized contract, from the perspective of the hedger, is obtained by taking q(y) = y, that is, by setting α 1 = α 2 = 0.
Initial Endowments of Equal Signs
We first examine the case where the initial endowments are of the same sign, specifically, we assume that x 1 ≥ 0 and x 2 ≥ 0. The next assumption postulates the existence of a 'martingale measure' in the present setup. All probability measures are assumed to be defined on (Ω, G T ).
Assumption 3.2 There exists a probability measure P l equivalent to P such that the processes S i,l,cld , i = 1, 2, . . . , d are ( P l , G)-local martingales.
The following result is borrowed from [14] (see Proposition 2.1 therein). Let us stress that the arbitrage-free property is here understood in the sense of [2] (see Section 3.1 therein). Proposition 3.1 If the initial endowments satisfy x 1 ≥ 0, x 2 ≥ 0 and Assumption 3.2 is valid, then Bergman's model is arbitrage-free for the hedger and the counterparty with respect to any contract (A, C).
In order to address the issue of bilateral pricing using a BSDE approach, we need to impose additional assumptions on the dynamics of risky assets. We will work under the following assumption regarding the quadratic variation process for continuous martingales S l,cld . Note that * stands for the transposition and, as in [12, 14] , we define the matrix-valued process S given by
Assumption 3.3 We postulate that: (i) there exists a probability measure P l equivalent to P such that S l,cld is a continuous, squareintegrable, ( P l , G)-martingale and has the predictable representation property with respect to the filtration G under P l , (ii) there exists an R d×d -valued, G-adapted process m l such that
where the process m l (m l ) * is invertible and satisfies m l (m l ) * = Sσσ * S. Here σ is a d-dimensional square matrix of G-adapted processes satisfying the ellipticity condition: there exists a constant
Following Nie and Rutkowski [13] , but with Q t = t, we denote by H 2,d 0 the subspace of all R d -valued, G-adapted processes X such that
and, for brevity, we write H 2 0 := H 2,1 0 . Also, let L 2 0 stand for the space of all real-valued, G Tmeasurable random variables η such that |η| 2
Definition 3.1 For any probability measure Q, we denote by A(Q) the following class of a realvalued, G-adapted processes A(Q) := X ∈ H 2 0 and X T ∈ L 2 0 under Q . Definition 3.1 will serve to define the class of admissible contracts with the choice of Q depending on a particular setup at hand. Let us stress that for any contract (A, C) the statement that A ∈ A(Q) will mean that the process A − A 0 of future cash flows belongs to the class A(Q). Recall that the initial cash flow A 0 of a contract (A, C) represents its initial price, so that is not given a priori.
For the reader's convenience, we first recall a result concerning the case of an exogenous collateral C (see Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 in [14] , as well as Proposition 5.2 in [2] ). 
(3.10)
In the next result, the hedger's collateral C is given by equation (3.5) . Note that the generator g l depends explicitly on the process Y 1 , which in turn is defined as a part of the solution of BSDE (3.11) . This means that the counterparty's BSDE (3.12) is coupled with the hedger's BSDE (3.11) . It is thus crucial to note that the hedger's price P h (x 1 , A, C) depends only on his initial endowment x 1 . By contrast, the counterparty's price depends on both initial endowments, x 1 and x 2 , so that it would be suitable to denote it as P c (x 1 , x 2 , −A, −C). However, for ease of notation, we shall write P c (x 2 , −A, −C), while keeping in mind that this process depends on x 1 as well. 
is the unique solution to the BSDE dY 1 and the counterparty's ex-dividend price equals P c :
with the generator g l given by
Proof. Since the collateral amount is not exogenously specified in the present framework, the process C may depend on the hedger's value, and thus Proposition 3.2 does not cover the current situation. However, from the proof of Proposition 5.2 in [2] , one can deduce that if BSDEs (3.9) and (3.10) have a unique solution, then the relationships
It is also worth stressing that we cannot apply directly the results of [13] to solve BSDEs (3.9) and (3.10), since the process A C depends also on Y h,l,x . However, since
we have that P h T = 0 and thus, by letting Z h,l,x1 := B l Z h,l,x1 , we obtain
By applying similar arguments to the counterparty's pricing problem, we obtain the equality
We conclude that if C is given by equation (3.5), then we have
and thus the pair (P h , Z h,l,x1 ) is a solution to BSDE (3.11) . Similarly, for Z c,l,x2 := −B l t Z c,l,x2 , we deduce that the pair (P c , Z c,l,x2 ) satisfies BSDE (3.12) .
It remains to verify that BSDEs (3.11) and (3.12) are indeed well-posed. One can check that f l (t, x 1 , 0, 0) = 0 and the mapping f l is uniformly m-Lipschitz generator (for the definition of the uniformly m-Lipschitz generator, see [13] ). Consequently, if A ∈ A( P l ) then, using Theorem 3.2 in [13] , we conclude that BSDE (3.11) has a unique solution (
where q is a uniformly Lipschitz continuous function and Y 1 ∈ H 2 0 , so that g l (t, x 2 , 0, 0) ∈ H 2 0 . Moreover, the mapping g l is also a uniformly m-Lipschitz generator, and thus BSDE (3.12) has also a unique solution (
We are now in a position to examine the range of fair bilateral prices at time t (see Definition 2.2). It appears that, under mild assumptions, this range is non-empty when the initial endowments of the two parties have the same sign. Let us note that this range may be empty, in general, if the initial endowments are of opposite signs, that is, when x 1 > 0 and x 2 < 0 (see Proposition 3.9(ii) in Section 3.2). 
so that the range of fair bilateral prices
Proof. In view of Proposition 3.3 and a suitable version of the comparison theorem for BSDEs (see
To demonstrate the latter inequality, we denote
where
Since, by Assumption 2.1, the inequality r l ≤ r b holds, we obtain
which is the required condition.
Remark 3.1 It is clear that analogous results can be established when the collateral depends only on the counterparty's value V c := V (x 2 , ϕ, −A, −C), specifically, when Assumption 3.1 is replaced by the postulate that C t = q(V c t − V 0 t (x 2 )) for some uniformly Lipschitz continuous function q such that q(0) = 0.
Remark 3.2 One can also prove similar results when the initial endowments satisfy x 1 ≤ 0 and x 2 ≤ 0, so that they are still of the same sign. The case where the initial endowments have opposite signs is more challenging and it is analyzed in Section 3.2.
European Claims in a Diffusion Model
The pricing and hedging of collateralized European claims in a diffusion model was recently studied by Mercurio [11] (see also Piterbarg [16] ). It should be pointed out that the hedger's and counterparty's initial endowments were implicitly assumed to be null in [11] . More importantly, the collateral amount for the hedger (resp., for the counterparty) was specified as a constant proportion of the hedger's (resp., the counterparty's) value, that is, it was postulated in [11] that C h = αV h and C c = αV c for some α ∈ [0, 1]. Such a specification of the margin account apparently corresponds to the situation where the hedger and the counterparty post/receive collateral of possibly different amounts to/from the third party independently of each other. Obviously, this is inconsistent with the real-life situation where the margin account is common for both parties, so that the collateral amount posted (resp., received) by one party is received (resp., posted) by another party.
For simplicity, let us assume d = 1, so that there is only one risky asset, S = S 1 . This restriction can be relaxed and thus Corollary 3.1 can be easily extended to the multi-asset framework.
Assumption 3.4 We assume that: (i) the risky asset S has the ex-dividend price dynamics under P given by the following expression,
where W is a one-dimensional Brownian motion and O is the domain of real values that are attainable by the diffusion process S (usually O = R + ), (ii) the filtration G is generated by the Brownian motion W , (iii) the coefficients µ and σ are such that SDE (3.14) has a unique strong solution, (iv) the dividend process equals
We observe that
We denote
and we suppose that a satisfies Novikov's condition
Let us define the probability measure P l by setting
From the Girsanov theorem, the probability measure P l is equivalent to P and the process W l is the Brownian motion under P l , where d W l t := dW t + a t dt. It is easy to see that the dynamics of the process S l,cld under P l are d S l,cld t = σ(t, S t ) d W l t and thus S l,cld is a ( P l , G)-(local) martingale with the quadratic variation S l,cld t = t 0 |σ(u, S u )| 2 du. Therefore, if (σ(·, S)) −1 S is bounded, Assumption 3.3 holds, since the Brownian motion W l is known to have the predictable representation property under (G, P l ).
Let us comment on the valuation and hedging of a European contingent claim with the hedger's collateral given by (3.5) . A generic European claim pays at its expiration date T the amount H T to the hedger, so that
We find it convenient to denote such a contract as (H T , C). From Proposition 3.4, we deduce the following corollary. 
Model with an Uncertain Money Market Rate
We continue working under the assumption that x 1 ≥ 0 and x 2 ≥ 0. Let us select any G-adapted interest rate process satisfying the following condition
We preserve all other assumptions regarding the market model at hand, including the set of traded risky assets but, for the sake of comparison, we now also consider an additional market model with the single uncertain money market rate r. To be more specific, part (iv) in Assumption 2.1 becomes:
for some G-adapted and bounded processes r, r l and r c . Under these assumptions, the hedger and the counterparty have the same ex-dividend price P r , which does not depend on their initial endowments. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the situation in now fully symmetric since we deal now with a single interest rate. Formally, the ex-dividend price process P r = Y now coincides with the unique solution to the BSDE
where the generator f is given by the following expression
The next result is not only more general but, in our opinion, it is also more natural than Proposition 4.1 in Mercurio [11] where, as was already mentioned at the beginning of Section 3.1.1, the collateral amount for each party was tied to his unilateral value of the contract. Note that the prices P h (0, A, C) and P c (0, −A, −C) are computed in Bergman's model with differential borrowing and lending rates r l and r b under the assumption that x 1 = x 2 = 0 and the collateral C is given by (3.5).
Proposition 3.5 Consider the market model with the money market rate r. (i) The price P r of any contract (A, C) such that A ∈ A( P l ) satisfies P r ≤ P h (0, A, C), P l − a.s. (ii) If x 1 = x 2 = 0 and the function q in equation (3.5) satisfies (r t − r c t )(q(y 1 ) − q(y 2 )) ≤ 0 for all y 1 ≥ y 2 , then also P c (0, −A, −C) ≤ P r , P l − a.s. Remark 3.3 Note that the condition (r t − r c t )(q(y 1 ) − q(y 2 )) ≤ 0 for all y 1 ≥ y 2 can be easily ensured. For instance, if q is an increasing function (e.g., the one given in Example 3.1 when α 1 , α 2 > −1), then it suffices to postulate that r t ≤ r c t . When x 1 ≥ 0 and x 2 ≥ 0, it is not clear whether the inequalities P c (x 2 , −A, −C) ≤ P r ≤ P h (x 1 , A, C) are valid. Indeed, Proposition 3.5 only shows that they are valid under the assumption that x 1 = x 2 = 0.
Remark 3.4 As in Section 5.4 of [12] , one can prove the monotonicity and stability properties of the price with respect to the initial endowment of each party. No difficulty arises in the case of the hedger's price. Since the counterparty's price P c (x 1 , x 2 , −A, −C) depends also on the hedger's initial endowment, the arguments used in [12] should be slightly modified.
Initial Endowments of Opposite Signs
So far, we worked under the assumption that the initial endowments of both parties are non-negative. We will now briefly examine the situation where x 1 ≥ 0 and x 2 ≤ 0. As in our previous work [12] , the concept of a 'martingale measure' will now be specified in a more abstract way than in Assumption 3.2 by making reference to some auxiliary process, which is hereafter denoted as β.
Assumption 3.5 We postulate that: (i) there exists a probability measure P β equivalent to P such that the processes S i,cld , i = 1, 2, . . . , d, which are given by
for some R d -valued, G-adapted, bounded processes β satisfying r b ≤ β i for i = 1, . . . , d, are ( P β , G)continuous, square-integrable martingales and have the predictable representation property with respect to the filtration G under P β , (ii) there exists an R d×d -valued, G-adapted process m such that
where mm * is invertible and satisfies mm * = Sσσ * S. Here σ is a d-dimensional square matrix of G-adapted processes, which satisfies the ellipticity condition (3.7).
The following proposition establishes the no-arbitrage property of Bergman's model under the present assumptions. Since the proof of this result is very similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2 in [12] , it is omitted. For the sake of comparison, we recall Proposition 3.3 from [14] concerning the case of exogenous collateral.
where the generators G h and G c are given by the following expressions
The next result covers the case of hedger's collateral when the initial endowments x 1 and x 2 have opposite signs. Since its proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3.3, it is not presented here. 
23)
with the generator f given by
24)
with the generator g given by
We are now in a position to analyze the range of fair bilateral prices when the initial endowments of counterparties are of opposite signs. We claim that if x 1 ≥ 0 and x 2 ≤ 0, then
We have thus proven that (3.26) is valid. If x 1 x 2 = 0, then the right-hand side in (3.26) is non-negative. Hence δ ≥ 0 and thus, from the comparison theorem for BSDEs and the equality (P h , P c ) = (Y 1 , Y 2 ) (see Proposition 3.8), we deduce that (3.25) is satisfied for every t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) We now assume that the interest rates r l and r b are deterministic and satisfy r l t < r b t for all t ∈ [0, T ]. If x 1 x 2 = 0, then the example from the proof of Proposition 5.4 in [12] gives a contract (A, C) with q ≡ 0, such that the inequality P c 0 (x 2 , −A, −C) > P h 0 (x 1 , A, C), P β − a.s., holds in the present framework, so that the set R f 0 (x 1 , x 2 ) is empty.
Bergman's Model with Negotiated Collateral
Our objective in Sections 4 and 6 is to analyze the situation where the collateral amount C relies upon both the hedger's value V h := V (x 1 , ϕ, A, C) and the counterparty's value V c := V (x 2 , ϕ, −A, −C). Specifically, Assumption 3.1 is replaced by the following postulate in which the collateral amount may depend on the contract's valuation by both parties. For convenience, we then say that the collateral is negotiated by the two parties, the sense that both the choice of the collateral convention q and the dynamic computation of the collateral amount C t involve both parties of a contract, in general.
Assumption 4.1
The negotiated collateral C is given by
where q : R 2 → R is a uniformly Lipschitz continuous function such that q(0, 0) = 0.
The case of a negotiated collateral should be contrasted with the situation considered in the preceding section, where it was postulated that the collateral amount was set by one party only. Let us observe that the prices for both parties will now depend on the vector of initial endowments (x 1 , x 2 ), but we will keep writing P h (x 1 , A, C) and P c (x 2 , −A, −C) instead of P h (x 1 , x 2 , A, C) and P c (x 1 , x 2 , −A, −C), respectively. For x 1 ≥ 0 and x 2 ≥ 0, using the arguments from the proof of Proposition 3.3, we obtain
Similarly, for x 2 ≤ 0, we have
We conclude that the following equality is valid, for x 1 ≥ 0 and an arbitrary x 2 ,
As a particular instance of equation (4.1), we can consider the convex collateralization given by q(y 1 , y 2 ) = αy 1 + (1 − α)y 2 for some α ∈ [0, 1], so that
Fully-Coupled Pricing BSDE
The following result, which covers the case of non-negative initial endowments, is a rather straightforward extension of Proposition 3.3 and thus its proof is omitted. It is worth noting that the processes Y and Z are R 2 -valued and R d×2 -valued, respectively. 
where g = (g 1 , g 2 ) * , A = (A, A) * and, for all y = (y 1 ,
Obviously, the prices for both parties depend here on the vector (x 1 , x 2 ) of initial endowments, so that the notation P h = P h (x 1 , x 2 , A, C) and P c = P c (x 1 , x 2 , −A, −C) would be more appropriate. However, for brevity, they will still be denoted as P h (x 1 , A, C) and P c (x 2 , −A, −C), respectively. The case of initial endowments of opposite signs is covered by the following proposition, which corresponds to Proposition 3.8. where g = ( g 1 , g 2 ) * , A = (A, A) * and, for all y = (y 1 , y 2 ) * ∈ R 2 and z = (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ R d×2 ,
Proof. Once again, the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.3. We also use Theorem 3.2 in [13] to show the well-posedness of BSDEs (4.3) and (4.6). Although the BSDE studied in [13] is one-dimensional, it is clear that Theorem 3.2 in [13] can be easily extended to the multi-dimensional framework.
Backward Stochastic Viability Property
To obtain the range of fair bilateral prices in the case of the negotiated collateral, one needs to compare the two components of a solution to fully-coupled BSDEs (4. Let us first recall the definition of the backward stochastic viability property (BSVP, for short), which was studied by Buckdahn et al. [4] . Let (Ω, F , P) be a probability space endowed with the filtration F generated by a d-dimensional Brownian motion W . For any Euclidean space H, we denote L 2 ad (Ω, C([0, T ], H)) by the closed, linear subspace of F-adapted processes of the space L 2 (Ω, F , P, C([0, T ], H)). Also, let L 2 ad (Ω × (0, T ), H) be the Hilbert space of F-adapted and measurable processes X such that X 2 = E T 0 |X t | 2 dt 1/2 < ∞. We now consider the following n-dimensional BSDE
where η is an R n -valued random variable and the generator h satisfies the following assumption. The following definition is due to Buckdahn et al. [4] . 
For a non-empty, closed, convex set of K ⊂ R n , let Π K (y) be the projection of a point y ∈ R n onto K and let d K (y) be the distance between y and K. The following result was established by Buckdahn et al. [4] . Then BSDE (4.9) has the BSVP in K if and only if for any t ∈ [0, T ], z ∈ R n×d and y ∈ R n such that d 2 K (·) is twice differentiable at y, we have
where M > 0 is a constant independent of (t, y, z).
Motivated by results from Hu and Peng [10] , we will show that Proposition 4.3 can be used to establish a convenient version of component-wise comparison theorem for the two-dimensional BSDE. Specifically, we prove the following theorem, in which we denote Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 ) * , Z = (Z 1 , Z 2 ) * and h(t, y, z) = h 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 , z 1 , z 2 ), h 2 (t, y 1 , y 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) * .
Theorem 4.1 Consider the two-dimensional BSDE
driven by the d-dimensional Brownian motion W , where the generator h = (h 1 , h 2 ) * satisfies Assumption 4.2. The following statements are equivalent:
ii) the following inequality holds, for all y 1 , y 2 ∈ R and z 1 , Proof. Let us denote Y = (Y 1 − Y 2 , Y 2 ) * , Z = (Z 1 − Z 2 , Z 2 ) * , η = (η 1 − η 2 , η 2 ) * and h(t, y, z) = ( h 1 (t, y, z), h 2 (t, y, z)) * where h 1 (t, y, z) := h 1 (t, y 1 + y 2 , y 2 , z 1 + z 2 , z 2 ) − h 2 (t, y 1 + y 2 , y 2 , z 1 + z 2 , z 2 ) and h 2 (t, y, z) := h 2 (t, y 1 + y 2 , y 2 , z 1 + z 2 , z 2 ).
Then statement (i) is equivalent to the following condition: (iii) for any date U ∈ [0, T ] and an arbitrary η = ( η 1 , η 2 ) such that η 1 ≥ 0, the unique solution ( Y , Z) to the following BSDE over time interval [0, U ]
satisfies Y 1 ≥ 0. By applying Proposition 4.3 to BSDE (4.14) and the convex, closed set K = R + ×R, we see that (iii) is in turn equivalent to (ii), since (4.11) coincides with (4.13) in that case.
Initial Endowments of Equal Signs
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we work under Assumption 3.4, so that we deal with a diffusion model. For simplicity, we present here the case of one risky asset driven by the one-dimensional Brownian motion W but, in view of Theorem 4.1, an extension to the case of d risky assets driven by a ddimensional Brownian motion is rather straightforward. Let us recall that the process a is given by equation (3.15 ).
Assumption 4.3
We postulate that the process a satisfies Novikov's condition (3.16) , the process (σ(·, S)) −1 and all the interest rates are continuous processes, and the process (σ(·, S)) −1 S is bounded.
Since
the pricing BSDE (4.3) reduces to
Y T = 0, or, equivalently,
We first focus on the valuation and hedging of the collateralized European contingent claim (H T , C) given by (3.18 ). Then (4.15) is equivalent to the following BSDE, for t ∈ [0, T ),
with an additional jump at terminal date T , which ensures that Y T = 0. It is thus clear that it suffices to examine the following BSDE on [0, T ]
where W l is a Brownian motion under the probability measure P l defined by (3.17). We are now in a position to study the range of fair bilateral prices at time t for the European claim with negotiated collateral. Recall that in the present framework we have that P h (x 1 , A, C) = P h (x 1 , x 2 , A, C) and P c (x 2 , −A, −C) = P c (x 1 , x 2 , −A, −C). Proof. We write σ −1 := (σ(t, S t )) −1 . It is sufficient to check that the functions h 1 and h 2 , which are given by h 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) := −g 1 t, y 1 , y 2 , σ −1 z 1 , σ −1 z 2 and h 2 (t, y 1 , y 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) := −g 2 t, y 1 , y 2 , σ −1 z 1 , σ −1 z 2 ,
where g 1 and g 2 are given by (4.4) and (4.5) with d = 1, respectively, satisfy Assumption 4.2 under P l and condition (4.13). First, using the continuity of (σ(·, S)) −1 , g 1 and g 2 with respect to t, we know that for y 1 , y 2 , z 1 , z 2 ∈ R, the function h 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) and h 2 (t, y 1 , y 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) are also continuous with respect to t. Second, since the process (σ(·, S)) −1 S is bounded and the function q is uniformly Lipschitz continuous, it is obvious that h 1 (t, y 1 , y 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) and h 2 (t, y 1 , y 2 , z 1 , z 2 ) are uniformly Lipschitz continuous with respect to (y 1 , y 2 , z 1 , z 2 ). Moreover, from q(0, 0) = 0 and x 1 , x 2 ≥ 0, we obtain h 1 (t, 0, 0, 0, 0) = h 2 (t, 0, 0, 0, 0) = 0.
We conclude that Assumption 4.2 holds for h 1 and h 2 . Let us check condition (4.13) is valid as well. If we set
Since r l t ≤ r b t , we have
which is the desired condition (4.13).
Let us now consider a more general contract A where the hedger receives cash flows H 1 , H 2 , . . . , H k at times 0 < t 1 ≤ t 2 ≤ . . . ≤ t k ≤ T , so that
where H l ∈ L 2 (Ω, F t l , P l ). For conciseness, we denote this claim as (H, C). ) where H l ∈ L 2 (Ω, F t l , P l ) for l = 1, 2, . . . , k we have, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
Proof. We first study the problem on [t k , T ]. Since dA t = 0, it is just a special case of Proposition 4.4 (it suffices to take H T = 0), we have that P c t ≤ P h t for all t ∈ [t k , T ]. Indeed, one can check directly that the equalities P c t = P h t = 0 hold for all t ∈ [t k , T ]. We now consider the problem on [t k−1 , t k ). Recall that (P h , P c ) * = Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 ) * where (Y, Z) solves BSDE (4.15) . From the first step, we know that Y 1,t k = Y 2,t k = 0. Let us consider BSDE (4.15) on [t k−1 , t k ]. Noticing that A only changes at time t k and ∆A t k = H k , we obtain, for s ∈ [t k−1 , t k ),
So this is nothing else than just the pricing BSDE for European claim with maturity t k and with receiving payoff H k . Therefore, using Proposition 4.4, we have that for
We can extend this inequality to [t k−2 , t k−1 ). Indeed, for s ∈ [t k−2 , t k−1 ),
Since from the second step, we know Y 2,t k−1 ≤ Y 1,t k−1 , using Theorem 4.1 and the proof of Proposition 4.4, we obtain Y 2,t ≤ Y 1,t for all t ∈ [t k−2 , t k−1 ), which in turn yields P c t ≤ P h t for all t ∈ [t k−2 , t k−1 ). By the backward induction, we conclude that (4.17) holds for every t ∈ [0, T ].
We also have the following result for the counterparty's price. 
To complete the proof, it suffices to use Theorem 4.1.
Remark 4.1 For a contract (A, C) with a more general process A, we may not have similar results. This is because that in (4.15), a general cash flow A may destroy the viability property. However, by mixing the two kinds of special contracts introduced in Propositions 4.5 and 4.6, we can construct the following class of contracts: for 0 < t 1 ≤ t 2 ≤ . . . ≤ t k ≤ T , and processes H l (t), l = 1, . . . , k defined on [t l , T ],
where, for l = 1, 2, . . . , k, the process H l (t), t ∈ [t l , T ], satisfies one of the following conditions:
By combining the statements and proofs of Propositions 4.5 and 4.6, one can show that the range of fair bilateral prices R f t (x 1 , x 2 ) for the contract (A, C) satisfying (i)-(ii) is non-empty almost surely.
Initial Endowments of Opposite Signs
We only consider here the case of a collateralized European contingent claim (H T , C), but similar results hold for two special kinds of contracts introduced in Propositions 4.5 and 4.6. We work under Assumptions 3.4 and 3.5 and we denote
Assumption 4. 4 We postulate that the process b satisfies Novikov's condition (3.16) , the processes (σ(·, S)) −1 , β and all interest rates are continuous processes and the process (σ(·, S)) −1 S is bounded.
Let us define the probability measure P β by setting
From the Girsanov theorem, the process W β is the Brownian motion under P β and thus S cld is a ( P β , G)-(local) martingale with the quadratic variation S cld t = t 0 |σ(u, S u )| 2 du. Moreover, since the process (σ(·, S)) −1 S is bounded, Assumption 3.5 holds. We conclude that the model is arbitrage free under P β (see Proposition 3.6) .
Under the present framework, BSDE (4.6) can be represented as follows
As in Section 4.3, it is thus sufficient to examine the following BSDE on [0, T ] 
Model with Partial Netting and Hedger's Collateral
In Sections 5 and 6, we consider the model with partial netting and full rehypothecation of the cash collateral. For a detailed description of this modeling framework, the reader is referred to [2, 12] . Our aim is to show that the methodology developed in preceding sections can be applied to this setup, albeit with possibly different conclusions regarding the properties of unilateral and bilateral prices. Since the proofs of some results are very similar to the proofs of their counterparts in Bergman's model, they are omitted.
From Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 of [12] , we know that for a self-financing trading strategy
the processes Y l := (B l ) −1 V p (x, ϕ, A, C) and Z l,i = ξ i , i = 1, 2, . . . , d satisfy
Throughout Section 5, we work under Assumption 3.1 of hedger's collateral.
Initial Endowments of Equal Signs
We first examine the case where the initial endowments satisfy x 1 ≥ 0 and x 2 ≥ 0. We notice that in such case, under Assumption 3.2 (or Assumption 3.3) the partial netting model is arbitrage-free with respect to any contract (A, C) for the hedger and the counterparty (see Proposition 3.1 in [12] ). Using Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 in [12] , we can establish the following proposition, which corresponds to Proposition 3.3 in the present work.
Model with an Uncertain Money Market Rate
We study here the case of initial endowments satisfying x 1 ≥ 0 and x 2 ≥ 0, but results for the case where x 1 ≥ 0 and x 2 ≤ 0 are similar. Let us select an arbitrary G-adapted interest rate process satisfying
We now consider the market model with the single money market rate r in which the hedger and counterparty have the same ex-dividend price P r independent of their respective initial endowments. The price P r = Y can be found by solving the BSDE
where the generator f equals
Similarly to Proposition 3.5, we have the following result under Assumption 3.1.
Proposition 5.3 For any contract (A, C) such that A ∈ A( P l ), the unique no-arbitrage price in the market model with the money market rate r satisfies P r ≤ P h (0, A, C), P l − a.s. If x 1 = x 2 = 0 and in addition, the function q in (3.5) satisfies (r t − r c t )(q(y 1 ) − q(y 2 )) ≤ 0 for all y 1 ≥ y 2 , then also P c (0, −A, −C) ≤ P r , P l − a.s.
Initial Endowments of Opposite Signs
Let us now consider the case where x 1 ≥ 0 and x 2 ≤ 0. We now postulate that r b ≤ r i,b and Assumption 3.5 holds with r b ≤ β i ≤ r i,b . From Proposition 3.2 in [12] , we know that the partial netting model is arbitrage-free for both the hedger and the counterparty in respect of any contract (A, C) and arbitrary initial endowments. Using Proposition 5.3 in [12] and argument similar as in the proof of Proposition 3.8, one can prove the following propositions. In view of the inequalities r i,b ≥ r b ≥ r l , Y 1 ≥ 0 and y + q(−y) ≥ 0 for all y ≥ 0, we conclude that
1 t ) ≥ 0 and thus the comparison theorem for BSDEs yields the desired inequality.
Price Independence of the Hedger's Initial Endowment
Our next goal is to demonstrate that for a certain class of contracts the hedger's price in the model with partial netting is independent of the initial endowment x 1 . The financial interpretation of Proposition 5.7 is that the hedger will never need to borrow cash from the account B b for hedging purposes and thus the actual level of his non-negative initial endowment is immaterial for his pricing problem. It is thus clear that a similar result will not hold when x 1 ≤ 0. By the same token, the independence property will not hold in Bergman's model, in general, since in the latter model the funding of positive positions in risky assets may require borrowing from the cash account B b . C) is such that the process A−A 0 is increasing and belongs to A( P β ). If the collateral C, as seen from the perspective of the hedger, is given by
where the function q satisfies −y+q(y) ≥ 0 for all y ≥ 0, then the counterparty's price P c t (x 2 , −A, −q) is independent of x 2 . However, if we still work under the assumption of the hedger's collateral, the problem requires more attention, since the counterparty's price depends also on the hedger's initial endowment x 1 . As shown in above proposition, for a contract (A, C) satisfying Assumption 5.1, the process Y 1 is independent of x 1 so that, obviously, the price P c t (x 2 , −A, −q) is independent of x 1 , but it still may depend on x 2 . It is not clear at this moment whether one can find some class of non-trivial contracts (A, C) with the hedger's collateral C given by (3.5) such that P c t (x 2 , −A, −q) does not depend on x 2 (it may still depend on x 1 ).
Positive Homogeneity of the Hedger's Price
We consider once again the hedger's price and we show that it is positively homogeneous with respect to the size of the contract and the non-negative initial endowment. Observe that this property is no longer true if only the size of the contract, but not the level of the hedger's initial endowment, is inflated (or deflated) through a non-negative scaling factor λ. Of course, this comment does not apply when the price of a contract is known to be independent of the hedger's initial endowment as is the case, for instance, under the assumptions of Proposition 5.7.
Proposition 5.8 Let x 1 ≥ 0 and Assumptions 3.1 and 3.5 be valid. For any contract (A, C) such that A − A 0 ∈ A( P β ) and the function q in equation (3.5) is positively homogeneous, meaning that q(λy) = λq(y) for all λ ≥ 0, then the hedger's price is positively homogeneous as well, specifically, for all λ ∈ R + and t ∈ [0, T ], P h t (λx 1 , λA, q) = λP h t (x 1 , A, q), P β − a.s. (5.13) Proof. It is obvious that (5.13) holds for λ = 0. Now we suppose that λ > 0. From Proposition 5.4, we know that P h (x 1 , A, q) = Y 1 where (Y 1 , Z 1 ) is the unique solution to the BSDE    dY 6 Model with Partial Netting and Negotiated Collateral
In the final section, we continue the analysis of the model with partial netting by studying the case where the collateral amount C is negotiated between the counterparties, in the sense that it depends on both the hedger's value V h := V (x 1 , ϕ, A, C) and the counterparty's value V c := V (x 2 , ϕ, −A, −C). As in Section 4, we postulate that the collateral satisfies Assumption 4.1. Recall that in that case we have P h (x 1 , A, C) = P h (x 1 , x 2 , A, C) and P c (x 2 , −A, −C) = P c (x 1 , x 2 , −A, −C), meaning that the two prices depend on the vector (x 1 , x 2 ) of initial endowments.
Initial Endowments of Equal Signs
The following result gives fully-coupled pricing BSDEs for both parties under the assumption that their initial endowments are non-negative.
